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Do the choices of consumers who search for a product’s best price exhibit risk neutral, risk averse
or loss averse risk attitudes? We study how in a problem of sequential search with costless recall
the relation between a consumer’s willingness to pay for continued search and the level of price
uncertainty depends on her risk preferences. Independent of the current best price, an increase in
price uncertainty encourages continued search when consumers are risk neutral. However, we prove
that theory predicts an inversion when consumers are either risk or loss averse. In those cases, an
increase in price uncertainty only increases the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for continued
search if the current best price is sufficiently low.
We subsequently use this observation in an empirical test to identify between different risk
preferences in a stylized problem of sequential search. In line with the inversion, we find that a
reduction in price uncertainty decreases the WTP for continued search when the current best price
is low but increases the WTP when it is high. While at odds with the assumption of risk neutrality,
this finding is consistent with models of consumer risk and/or loss aversion. Moreover, the model
parameters of risk and loss aversion that lead to the best empirical fit have values similar to those
estimated for other decision domains.
JEL classification: D11, D12, D83, M31
Keywords: consumer search, risk aversion, loss aversion, price uncertainty
1 Introduction
Do the choices of consumers who search for a product’s best price exhibit risk-neutral, risk averse
or loss averse risk attitudes in the money dimension? In current research in industrial organization,
two approaches to modeling risk preferences co-exist. In studies where consumer risk attitudes are
not central to the analysis, consumers are simply assumed to be risk neutral with the decision to
∗Corresponding author: University of Groningen, EEF, P. O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands,
a.r.soetevent@rug.nl.
†University of Groningen, EEF, P. O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands, t.bruzikas@rug.nl. We gratefully
acknowledge valuable comments from Marco Haan, Maarten Janssen, and participants at IIOC 2016. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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search being the outcome of a rational cost-benefit analysis.1 A second, more recent strand of liter-
ature enriches the modeling of consumer preferences with elements from behavioral economics such
as reference dependent preferences and loss aversion. In this approach, consumers are assumed to
experience gain-loss utility relative to a reference point with the losses having a higher impact on
consumer well-being than equivalent gains.2
The literature thus postulates either risk-neutrality or loss-aversion at the demand side and focuses
on the implications for the design of optimal price distributions by profit-maximizing firms. Probably
due to its emphasis on equilibrium price distributions, two issues have remained relatively unexplored.
First, direct empirical evidence on how risk attitudes influence the decisions of agents in stylized
situations of sequential search by considering actual choices is lacking.3 Most of the existing evidence
is indirect in the form of observed price distributions that can only be an equilibrium outcome in
a model in which consumers are not risk neutral. We believe that additional justification for the
modeling assumptions in the form of direct evidence is useful. We provide such evidence and test
whether findings on risk and loss aversion can be extrapolated to the task domain of price search.
Second, no models in sequential search explicitly study how risk aversion instead of loss aversion
affects a consumer’s reservation price strategies. As we will elaborate below, the neglect of risk aversion
– in favor of loss aversion – is to some extent justified both by theoretical arguments and by indirect
evidence derived from observed price distributions. However it would be comforting to have direct
evidence that models with loss aversion fit empirical data on actual search decisions at least as well
as competing models that incorporate risk aversion. We aim to provide such evidence by deriving the
theoretical implications of different risk attitudes (risk neutrality, risk aversion and loss aversion) on
an agent’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for continued search in a simple problem of sequential search.
We subsequently present stylized versions of this problem to empirical subjects and evaluate which of
the models best fits the data. We show how the relation between the WTP for continued search and
the variance of the price distribution is dependent on the consumer having risk neutral, risk averse
or loss averse preferences. More specifically, we prove that when prices are normally distributed and
the consumer is risk neutral, a mean-preserving reduction in the variance decreases the WTP to
sample again, independent of the currently observed best price. In contrast, for risk- and loss averse
1E.g. Janssen and Shelegia (2015); Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez (2011).
2E.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014) incorporate loss aversion in the money/price (and product) dimension to explain
the empirical phenomenon of regular sales. Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) use consumer loss-aversion to explain the
wide use of flat-rate tariffs. Other recent examples of IO studies with gain-loss utility in the price dimension are Carbajal
and Ely (2016); Karle and Peitz (2014); Karle, Kirchsteiger and Peitz (2015).
3Schunk and Winter (2009) is an exception.
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consumers, this positive correlation only holds when the current best price is sufficiently low.
Our approach and presentation differs in two ways from studies on search in IO that commonly
consider equilibrium price distributions. Throughout, we take the price distribution as exogenously
given. This allows us to focus on the decision-making problem of a consumer who currently observes
a price and has to decide whether or not to sample again from a given distribution.4 Also, most
studies on search impose a fixed and constant search cost per sample and, conditional on this cost,
derive the buyer’s reservation price. That is, once the buyer samples a price lower than or equal to
his reservation price, he will stop searching and purchase. We instead will condition on the currently
observed best price and derive how much the consumer is willing to pay for another price observation.
This presentation is primarily motivated by our empirical implementation in which we ask subjects to
state how much they are willing to pay for another sample. As we shall illustrate, for all assumptions
made on consumer risk preferences, there is a simple monotonic relation between the WTP and the
reservation price.5
As said, the literature on search is remarkably void of theoretical models with risk-averse expected
utility maximizing consumers.6 There seem to be two main reasons for the absence of risk aversion in
search theory. First, the focus in this field is on the (mixed-strategy) equilibrium price distributions
that result from different underlying models of consumer decision making than on studying the actual
decisions of consumers who are in a price search situation. Models that assume loss averse consumers
are able to generate rich equilibrium price distributions with discontinuities that offer an explana-
tion for important characteristics of empirically observed price patterns, such as sales (Heidhues and
Ko˝szegi, 2014). In turn, the fact that such price patterns are observed is indirect evidence for the pres-
ence of loss averse consumers. Lacking the kink in the utility function at the reference point, models
with risk averse consumers have much less interesting implications for equilibrium price distributions.
Second, the search cost and the price of the goods considered are usually modest compared to the
searching consumer’s wealth. Combined with the forceful argument by Rabin (2000) and Rabin and
Thaler (2001) that expected utility theory should be abandoned as an explanation for risk aversion
over modest stakes, this has been an important motivation for theorists to focus on loss aversion and
not risk aversion as the relevant risk attitude to study.
4Carlson and McAfee (1983) also assume a price distribution that is unrelated to the equilibrium distribution.
5The willingness-to-pay is sometimes also called the ex ante compensating variation, since it indicates how much a
buyer who initially faces a (in our case, degenerate) price distribution F is willing to pay to replace F with another
distribution G. That is, for a consumer endowed with income m and an indirect utility function V (·), the WTP s∗ is




V (p,m− s)dG (see Schlee, 2008).
6We ignore the literature on insurance markets in which risk aversion of course plays an important role.
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At first sight, one may believe that results in contributions that do not make any assumptions
at all on the underlying risk preferences encompass the case with risk-averse agents. An example is
Stahl (1989) where buyers continue sampling observations as long as the expected consumer surplus
exceed the cost of search.7 However, as Stennek (1999) and Schlee (2008) have pointed out, expected
consumer surplus as a measure of a buyer’s willingness to pay to for another price observation is
problematic in case the buyer is not risk neutral in the money dimension. Because of its elegance
and relatedness to the problem we study in the present paper, we quote Stennek’s (1999, p. 266)
exposition of this problem in full:
“Consider a consumer with an income, m, who has a unit demand for the commodity,
and a willingness to pay α ≤ m. Hence, there are no income or price effects. Assume
that the price is stochastic, but that p ≤ α. The residual income m − p is spent on a
composite commodity with a unitary price. Since the consumer always consumes one unit
of the good, his ordinal utility can be measured by his consumption of the composite good,
that is m − p. If the consumer dislikes variations in the consumption of the composite
good (utility is a concave function of m − p), the consumer is risk-averse with respect
to variations in residual income. Hence, a mean-preserving reduction in the variance of
the price would increase the consumer’s welfare. The consumer’s surplus is defined as the
area under the demand function above the price line, that is α − p. Let Ep denote the
expected price, then the expected consumer’s surplus is α − Ep, which is independent of
price dispersion. That is, relying on the consumer’s surplus, one would falsely conclude
that the consumer does not value a stabilization of the price at its mean.”
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our stylized problem of sequential search with
costless recall. We show how the relation between the WTP for continued search and the variance
of the price distribution is dependent on the consumer having risk neutral, risk averse or loss averse
preferences. In Section 3, we use this result in our identification strategy to separate choices consistent
with risk neutral risk attitudes from choices indicative of risk and/or loss averse risk attitudes in the
price dimension. We elicit the WTP of over 300 individuals who each face four situations that differ
in whether the current best price and the price variance is either high or low. The results of this non-
incentivized experiment show support for the specifications with risk or loss aversion.8 Both models
have a good fit with the data for parameter values of risk and loss aversion, respectively, similar to
7We thank Alexei Parakhonyak for directing our attention to this issue. The final section of Kohn and Shavell (1974)
also considers the impact of risk aversion on the decision to continue search.
8For evidence on stated preferences being similar to revealed preferences, see e.g. Kesternich et al. (2013).
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those estimated in other decision domains. This is reassuring because it justifies recent efforts in
industrial economics to develop theory that shows how alternative risk-attitudes by buyers impact
equilibrium price distributions.
2 Price uncertainty and search
The stylized version of the decision problems that we present to our subjects is as follows. Figure 1
shows four combinations of price distributions and current best prices. Panels a and c show distri-
butions with high price variation σH whereas the variance is low (σL) in panels b and d; in panels a
and b the current best price is low (pL) whereas in panels c and d it is high (pH). In each of these
cases, one can ask how much an agent, who currently observes price pL or pH , is willing to pay for
sampling once again from the given price distribution. This is a problem of sequential search with
costless recall. As we formally show in Sections 2.1 to 2.3, it turns out that the prediction regarding
the agent’s WTP critically depends on whether the agent is risk neutral, risk averse or loss averse in
the money dimension. For risk neutral agents, a reduction in price uncertainty reduces the expected
benefits of continued search, both when the currently observed price pL is low (pL < µ, a move from
panel a to b), but also when the currently observed price pH is high (pH > µ, a move from panel c to
d).9 Specifications that incorporate either risk aversion or loss aversion instead predict an inversion:
the willingness to pay for continued search following a reduction in price variance decreases when the
current best price is low but increases when this current best price is sufficiently high.
One reason to focus our design on how changes in price uncertainty affect search decisions are
the different empirical implications for models with risk neutrality on the one hand and risk and loss
aversion on the other hand. Another reason is that recent contributions in theory have established a
connection between price uncertainty and the information provided to consumers about the common
cost components of firms. One empirical example of a market where common cost components form
a major determinant of prices and where firms can credibly inform consumers about these costs is
the retail gasoline market. In this market, prices are to a great extent determined by the gasoline
spot market price. Janssen et al. (2011) build on Stahl (1989) to incorporate cost uncertainty into
the search literature. One of their results is that in a sequential search model with production cost
uncertainty, the ex ante price uncertainty (as measured by the price spread) is higher when consumers
are uninformed about the firms’ cost realization, a situation similar to panels 1a and 1c. Janssen
9How is this in search without recall? Well, in that case the agent stops searching iff. p1 ≤ E[p] + s. Clearly, since
a change in σ does not alter either the left-hand side nor the right-hand side of this equation, a change in σ does not
change the expected benefits of continued search.
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(a) Current price low, σ high.


















(b) Current price low, σ low.


















(c) Current price high, σ high.


















(d) Current price high, σ low
Figure 1: A price distribution with high (panels a and c: N(15, 5)) and low (b and d: N(15, 2)) price
variation. The currently observed price is either low (a and b: pL = 10) or high (c and d: pH = 20).
et al. (2011) also cite the pricing by gas stations as a motivation for their work, as does the earlier
Benabou and Gertner (1993). In their models however, firms cannot give credible signals about the
common cost and consumers have to infer this from the observed prices.10 Whereas these studies
study the implications for certain characteristics of the equilibrium price distributions, such as the
price expectation and equilibrium price spread, our aim instead is to uncover how searching consumers
actually respond to changes in price uncertainty.
Before we move on to the empirical application, we first state the theoretical results for that
motivate the design of our test. Section 2.1 gives the empirical predictions for the case with risk-
10In other work (Bruzˇikas et al., 2016) we provide empirical evidence that in the Dutch retail gasoline market, firms
do use their price boards to inform consumers about their recommended price. This recommended price closely follows
fluctuations in the spot price of crude oil. Since this is an important cost component common to all firms, oil companies
effectively inform consumers about the realization of a common cost component.
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neutral consumers. Given that this is the default assumption in most studies, it is no surprise that
the analytical results we present in this section are not new and have appeared elsewhere often in a
different form and context. This section is followed by two others that presents results for the cases
with risk- or loss-averse consumers. This approach and these findings are new.
2.1 Risk neutral consumers
Theories of sequential search with costless recall commonly assume that agents with unit demand for
a good continue to search until the expected benefit of further search is smaller than the fixed cost s
of sampling one more observation from a distribution F (p) of prices charged by firms11. That is, the
agent will stop searching if the currently observed best price p1 satisfies the familiar condition:
p1 ≤ E[min(p, p1)] + s or, equivalently
∫ p1
0
F (p)dp ≤ s. (1)
That is, an agent’s optimal strategy is to continue search as long as the lowest price observed is greater
than p∗, with p∗ being the reservation price that is the solution to
∫ p
0 F (p)dp = s. Stated differently
s(p) =
∫ p
0 F (p)dp denotes the WTP for continued search when the current best price is p1: the agent
continues her search as long as s(p) > s.
An important step in arriving at this result is that the agent’s utility is assumed to be linear in
prices/wages. This effectively equates the objective of maximizing expected utility to the maximization
of expected payoffs by a risk neutral agent.
Proposition 1 (Risk-neutral agents) Suppose that prices are distributed p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this
is common knowledge. Then, given a current best price p1 ∈ (0, p¯), with p¯ ≡ F−1(1−F (0)), the WTP
for continued search s(p1) =
∫ p1
0 F (p;µ, σ)dp is increasing in σ for p1 > 0:
12
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix.
In other words, independently of the price currently observed, an increase in the value of σ (without
changing µ) will increase the expected benefits of continued search to risk-neutral agents. This is what
Be´nabou and Gertner (1993, p. 83) dub the variance effect : “Given that buyers can return to the
first store costlessly, an increase in the variance . . . of the conditional distribution increases the option
value of search.” They already note that an increase in the unconditional variance of the common
11Stigler (1961); Rothschild (1973); Lippman and McCall (1976); Reinganum (1979); Weitzman (1979).
12Note that if, as we will do, µ and σ are chosen such that the probability of observing negative prices is zero, F (0) = 0,
the upper bound p¯ = +∞.
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cost component leads to such an increase in the conditional variance. Also, the result of Proposition 1
appears for general distributions as a corollary in Kohn and Shavell (1974, p. 115).13
We will however show next this variance effect no longer holds in settings with risk-averse agents
whose preferences are described by a CARA utility function.
2.2 Risk averse conumers
Consider a risk-averse agent with CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw (with w current wealth and
γ ∈ R+) who observes price draws out of a N(µ, σ)-distribution.14 The agent has to decide between
stopping and buying at the current best price or to search once more.15 If the agent buys the product
at the best price p1 observed so far, her utility is
u(Stop|w − p1; γ) = −1
γ
e−γ(w−p1) (2)
Her expected utility in case of continued search, paying a cost s for one more draw, is
E[u(Continue|w − p− s; γ)] = −1
γ
E[e−γ(w−p−s)] (3)
Equating (2) and (3) and solving for s via a number of manipulations (see Appendix A.2) leads to
following proposition concerning the agent’s maximum willingness to pay s(p1) to continue search:
Proposition 2 (Risk-averse agents) Suppose that prices are distributed p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this
is common knowledge. For a risk-averse agent with CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw (with w
current wealth and γ ∈ R+ the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion), the willingness to
pay s(p) to sample one more observation when the best price encountered so far is p1, equals:










eγp1(1− erf(x)) + eγ(µ+γσ2/2)(1 + erf(x˜))
}]
, (4)
where x ≡ (p1 − µ)/σ
√
2 and x˜ ≡ (p1 − µ − γσ2)/σ
√




> 0 (< 0) if p1 < p
R
1 (p1 > p
R
1 ).
13Their Corollary 20 reads: “If the utility function is linear, a mean-preserving increase in risk can only raise the
switchpoint level of utility.” The agent will stop searching if and only if the utility of the best price is higher than the
switchpoint level.
14In all situations we consider, the agent buys the good so we submerge the gross utility of consuming the good in w.
15Note that with risk averse agents, it is important to impose that continued search implies only one more draw,
because, as pointed out by Kohn and Shavell (1974, p. 114), even for risk averse agents the option value of search may
increase following a mean-preserving increase in risk if they are allowed to sample many times.
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For x˜ close to 0, pR1 is approximated by





Proposition 2 shows an inversion in the response to changes in price uncertainty: a reduction
in price uncertainty will decrease the option value of searching once more for risk averse consumers
whose current best price is sufficiently low. For risk averse consumers for whom the current best
price however is at the high end of the price distribution the option value of sampling once again
will increase following a decrease in price uncertainty. The intuition is that in a situation of large
price uncertainty, especially agents whose current best price is high can potentially receive a much
better price by searching once more. However, risk aversion has the effect of lowering the utility
associated with larger gains. Therefore, for risk averse consumers whose current best price is high, the
option value to continue search is higher after a mean-preserving reduction in the variance of the price
distribution because in expected utility, the decreases the probability of large gains are outweighed by
the increases in the probability of small gains. The result also shows that if the current best price is
sufficiently low, the latter effect can no longer compensate for the negative impact of the former.16
2.3 Loss averse consumers
Next we consider the case with loss averse agents. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), the agent’s
utility is now specified as u(w|r) ≡ m(w) + µ (m(w)−m(r)) with w a wealth level and r a reference
wealth level. The first term m(w) denotes a reference independent consumption utility. The second
term is the gain-loss utility function, which reflects that the agent experiences a loss (gain) when her
outcome is less (more) than the reference level. We will assume that consumption utility is linear,
m(w) = w, and use the common piecewise linear specification of the gain-loss function:{
η(w − r) if w > r;
ηλ(w − r) if w ≤ r. (5)
In this expression, η is a weight that reflect the relative importance of gain-loss utility to the agent
compared to consumption utility. Throughout, we normalize the weight on gains by setting η = 1.
This is a common approach and without loss of much generality. λ ≥ 1 is the parameter of loss
aversion. Loss-neutrality corresponds to λ = 1. We assume that the agent takes the current best
price as the reference point with respect to which gains and losses are evaluated: r = p1. There
16We leave it to future work to prove this for other distributions. Kaplan and Menzio (2015) find that empirical price
distributions typically are symmetric and unimodal but leptokurtic, that is, having thicker tails and more mass around
the mean than a Normal distribution with the same mean and variance. We believe that adding the latter properties to
our model would not change our findings while considerably complicating the analysis.
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is no consensus in the literature on how reference points with respect to prices are formed. As in
Zhou (2011), we assume the the agent takes the current best price as her reference point. This seems
reasonable: the agent experiences a loss if she ends up paying net more (including the search cost)
after having searched one more shop than when she would have decided to stop searching and buy at
price p1. Finding a price that is sufficiently low that the cost of search are covered leads to a gain.
One interpreration is that “no search” is the status quo that serves as the agent’s reference point.17
The loss averse agent compares the net benefit of buying at the current best price u(Stop|p1) =
w − p1 with the utility from continued search. The latter is the sum of expected consumption utility
plus the expected value of the gain-loss value function:
u(Continue|p1) = w − p1 − s+ P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1] + η [P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ {P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1] + sP (p > p1 − s)}] .
The first term, v − p1 − s + P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1], reflects consumption utility: the agent’s net
wealth after search is w − p1 − s in case the search does not lead to a better price. However, with
probability P (p ≤ p1), the agent observes a price lower than p1 with the expected price differential in
that case being equal to E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1].
Note that we assume that the search cost is part of the gain-loss utility: the agent only experiences
a gain if searching results if is leads to a price sufficiently low to fully recoup the cost of search, which
happens with probability P (p ≤ p1 − s). In all other cases the search cost is not or only partly made
up for by a better price deal. Again, we derive the WTP for continued search s(p1) by equating
u(Continue|p1) and u(Stop|p1) and solving for s. Doing so leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 (Loss-averse agents) Suppose that prices are distributed p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this
is common knowledge. For a loss-averse agent with loss-aversion parameters λ and η who takes the





> 0 (< 0) if p1 < p
L
1 (p1 > p
L
1 ),
with s(p1) the willingness to pay to sample one more observation. In the limit, limλ↓1 pL1 =∞.
Proposition 3 proves that qualitatively, we have a similar inversion as in the model with risk aversion.
Other than for the model with risk-aversion, we cannot derive an analytical expression for s(p1) in
17We are aware of possible alternative choices here, such at the expectation-based reference points developed by Ko¨szegi
and Rabin (2006).
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terms of the fundamental model parameters. We can however show that ds
∗
dσ > 0 when p1 exceeds a
unique critical threshold value pL1 . In the limit to loss-neutrality (λ ↓ 1), this threshold value goes to
infinity such that ds
∗
dσ > 0 for all values of p1, as in Proposition 1.
2.4 Empirical implications
A comparison of Proposition 2 and 3 shows that if the best price observed so far is sufficiently high,
risk and loss aversion generate the same qualitative prediction that the willingness to continue search
is decreasing in σ. The numerical examples in Table 1 provide some additional insight. Based on
the discrete distributions that we will use in our empirical analysis (Section 3), the table shows for
different values of the parameters of risk and loss aversion (γ and λ, respectively) the maximal WTP
for continued search.18
Let’s focus on the case where the current best price is high, p1 = 20. At levels of risk aversion
commonly found in the empirical studies measuring risk aversion using a CARA specification (γ ≈ 0.10
see e.g. Von Gaudecker et al., 2011) the WTP for continued search is higher in the low variance case
than in the high variance case (4.80 vs. 4.55). The same holds for the model with loss aversion for the
commonly found estimates of the loss aversion coefficient of λ ≈ 2.25 (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Engstro¨m et al., 2015) (4.52 vs. 4.61).
Figure 2 shows the relation between the search cost s and the reservation price r for the different
risk attitudes, using γ = 0.10 and λ = 2.25 for risk and loss aversion, respectively. In all cases,
the relation is monotone with the reservation price increasing in the cost of search. In line with
Propositions 1 to 3, for any given search cost s, the reservation price for the high variance case is
lower than for the low variance case in case of risk neutrality whereas for risk averse and loss averse
risk preferences, the inversion is observed. A comparison of panels 2b and 2c also shows in this setting
and for the values γ = 0.10 and λ = 2.25, risk and loss aversion have very similar implications: both
for the situation with low variance as for the one with high variance, the relation between the search
cost and reservation price is almost identical. This implies that while our design is able to distinguish
between risk neutrality on the one hand and risk/loss aversion on the other, it is not very suitable to
separately identify risk and loss aversion.
Future research could use the fact that, as shown in Table 1, the gap in WTP between the low
and high variance case grows faster under risk aversion. The table shows that the main cause of this
difference is that under risk aversion, the WTP in the high variance case is decreases relatively fast as
18Using instead the continuous distributions from Figure 1 leads to a very similar table.
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Table 1: WTP for continued search under risk aversion (CARA exponential utility u(z, γ) = − 1γ e−γz)
and loss aversion (linear gain-loss utility with weight η = 1).
WTP - Risk Aversion (CARA) WTP - Loss Aversion
p1 10 10 20 20 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low High Low High Low
γ λ
0.00 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01 1.00 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01
0.01 0.33 0.01 5.25 4.99 1.20 0.30 0.01 5.17 4.94
0.05 0.31 0.01 4.92 4.91 2.00 0.23 0.01 4.64 4.69
0.10 0.29 0.01 4.55 4.80 2.25 0.21 0.01 4.52 4.61
0.20 0.25 0.01 3.88 4.60 3.00 0.18 0.01 4.15 4.45
0.30 0.23 0.01 3.35 4.40 3.50 0.16 0.00 3.96 4.34
0.40 0.20 0.01 2.92 4.20 5.00 0.12 0.00 3.52 4.09
0.50 0.19 0.01 2.58 4.01 9.00 0.08 0.00 2.79 3.68
γ increases19. The reason for this difference is that in the specifications we use, we have a linear gain-
loss function while in the risk-averse case, the benefits of search enter the expected utility function
in a non-linear fashion. This has the effect that the potentially high benefits from search induced
by high price uncertainty receive relatively less weight in the latter case. The small number of four




As part of their weekly tutorial 337 first-year students at the Department of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Groningen were exposed to four different choice situations that emulate those shown in
Figure 1. For each situation, they had to answer how much they would be willing to pay to see the
price of a second firm.20 The students were all enrolled in an the undergraduate program at the de-
partment. The majority (182) were first-year students in Economics and Business Economics (E&BE).
Another 83 were enrolled in the program Econometrics and Operations Research (EOR), a program
that traditionally attracts students with well-developed quantitative skills. Fifty-five students were
enrolled in the so-called pre-MSc program. This is a one-year program designed for students with
a non-economics BSc to prepare for a MSc in Economics. The remaining seventeen students were
enrolled in the Finance program.
19Compare e.g. the case with γ = 0.50 and λ = 5.00: for p1 = 20, the WTP is similar when σ = σL, 4.01 vs. 4.09, but
considerably different when σ = σH , 2.58 vs. 3.52.
20See Appendix C for the exact layout and wording of the survey.
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(a) Risk neutrality.
(b) Risk aversion (γ = 0.10).
(c) Loss aversion (λ = 2.25).
Figure 2: Relation between the search cost s and the reservation price r(s) for consumers with risk
neutral (panel a), risk averse (panel b), and loss averse (panel c) risk attitudes.
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(a) Situation 1: pL = 10, σH = 4.60 high. (b) Situation 2: pL = 10, σL = 2.06 low.
(c) Situation 3: pH = 20, σH = 4.60 high. (d) Situation 4: pH = 20, σL = 2.06 low.
Figure 3: Overview of the four situations presented to respondents. The bars denote the number of
firms that charges a given price (µ = 15 in all cases).
In order to ensure that students had no problems in understanding the price distributions, we
used discrete price distributions in the experiment. These distributions are shown in Figure 3. They
have a mean (µ = 15) and variance (σL = 2.06;σH = 4.60) that closely mimic the ones in Figure 1.
By using discrete distributions, there was no need for participants to have an intimate knowledge of
probability density functions, normally distributed variables, variance etc. Subjects who would like
to do so, could relatively easily calculate the expected benefits of continued search. They just had
to calculate for each price lower than the current best price the difference with the current price, to
multiply this difference with the probability of finding the lower price and sum the results. We refer
to the four choice situations in Figure 3 as (pL, σH), (pL, σL), (pH , σH), and (pH , σL), respectively.
Each student was presented with all four situations on five stapled pages. To rule out order
effects, we randomized the order in which the situations were presented.21 The first page contained
the following information: “Please consider the situations on the following four pages and answer the
question that follows the descriptions.” Each panel on the pages 2 to 5 was accompanied by a brief
21The four possible orders were: pLsH−pLsL−pHsH−pHsL; pLsL−pLsH−pHsL−pHsH ; pHsH−pHsL−pLsH−pLsL;
pHsL − pHsH − pLsL − pLsH . Table B.1 shows for the final sample for each particular order the number of observations
per program.
14
explanatory text and the question how much they were willing to pay for one additional search. To
give an example, the text for situation (pL, σH) was as follows:
“You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just visited offers this product at
a price of e10. There are 100 other firms that offer exactly the same product. You know
that two of these firms charge a price of e5, five charge a price of e7, eight charge a price
of e9 etc. This information is summarized in the figure above (the current price of e10
is shown by the dotted vertical line). Unfortunately you don’t know which firm charges
what price.
Now you have to decide:
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this firm’s price of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the 100 other firms to see
whether this firm offers you the product at a better price.
Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to buy the product at e10
from the first firm, should the second firm be more expensive. If the second firm charges
a price lower than e10, you can of course buy the product at this lower price.
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see the price of a second
firm? [please fill in a non-negative number with two digits]
e ”
Students were free to move forward and back between pages and to change their answers if they
deemed this necessary.
3.2 Results
Of the 337 subjects, 29 did not give an answer to any of the four situations. Another 15 students
completed one to three situations.22 We decided to drop all 44 observations. One other subject
provided answers in the range e100 to e300. Possibly, this subject has answered the questions in
cents instead of euro’s but there was no way to verify this. For this reason, we decided to drop all
observations of subjects who – for one or more of the situations – indicated a willingness to pay for
search that exceeded the price observed at the current shop. This reduced the number of observations
22Six persons answered three questions; five answered two and four answered one. With 4.8%, the dropout rate from
the EOR sub-sample is considerably lower than for the other majors (14.8% for E&BE, 16.4% for Pre-MSc, and 23.5%
for Finance). This is because students of the latter majors were asked to complete this non-obligatory survey after their
weekly tutorial test and may therefore have been less willing to participate because of their – literally – outside option.
However, we have no reason to suspect that the participation decision is correlated with our outcomes of interest.
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Table 2: Summary statistics respondents.
age grade
Programme obs. % female mean s.d. mean s.d.
Economics and Business 146 30.4 19.33 1.35 6.74 1.50
Econometrics 79 31.6 19.05 1.45 6.39 1.40
Pre-MSc 46 33.3 23.67 1.71 7.00 1.31
Minor Finance 12 30.0 22.24 1.73 7.00 1.76
Total 283 31.2 19.92 2.16 6.67 1.46
Notes: Econometrics students follow a different Microeconomics course than the other three
groups. The statistics of the econometrics students are for all students who took the exam
and slightly differ from the sample of students who completed the survey (85 vs. 79 obs.).
by ten such that our final data set includes 283 observations. Background characteristics of these
individuals are provided in Table 2.
The expected benefits of continued search are e0.33 in (pL, σH); e0.01 in (pL, σL), e5.33 in
(pH , σH), and e5.01 in (pH , σL). Based on this, a risk neutral agent would indicate WTP (pL, σH) >
WTP (pL, σL) and WTP (pH , σH) > WTP (pH , σL). However, Table 3 shows that is not what we
find in the data. When the best price observed so far is at the lower end (pL = 10), respondents do
indicate an on average higher WTP when the variance of the price distribution is higher, e0.83 vs.
e0.46 (p-value < 0.0001, paired t-test, unless stated otherwise). This is in line with the theoretical
predictions for risk neutral agents. In both cases, the average WTP exceeds the expected benefits of
search, with e0.50 and e0.45, respectively, but this difference is not significant (p = 0.438).
However, when the best price observed so far is at the high end (pH = 20), the average WTP
for continued search is e4.92 when the price variation is high and e5.15 when this variation is low
(p = 0.154). Moreover, while the WTP/expected benefits gap is still positive for the low variance
case (e0.144), it is negative (-e0.406) for the high variance case and this difference is statistically
significant (p = 0.0007). In other words, at odds with risk neutrality but in line with the alternative
hypotheses of risk aversion and loss aversion, the respondents’ average WTP is decreasing in price
variation when the currently observed price is high.23
Table 4 considers decisions at the level of the individual subject and provides further support for
our main finding. The table shows that when the current best price is low, almost no subjects (1.4%)
indicate a higher WTP for continued search when the price variation is low. In contrast, when the
current best price is high, 40.6% of all subjects indicates a higher WTP when price uncertainty is low
instead of high. To see whether the WTP/expected benefit-gap is related to any observable charac-
23The difference of -e0.406 and 0 has a p-value of 0.107 (one-sided t-test).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
p 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low
Exp. benefits search 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01
mean WTP 0.830 0.456 4.924 5.154
(0.118) (0.109) (0.251) (0.251)
WTP/Exp. Benefit gap 0.500 0.446 -0.406 0.144
obs. 283 283 283 283
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Ranking of willingness to pay on the subject level
WTP (pL, σH) TWTP (pL, σL)
> = <
> 31 37 2 70 24.7%
WTP (pH , σH) TWTP (pH , σL) = 20 77 1 98 34.6%
< 51 63 1 115 40.6%
102 177 4 283
36.0% 62.5% 1.4%
teristics, define the binary variable y such that y = 1 if WTP>Expected benefits and 0 otherwise.
Table 5 shows for our four situation the results of a linear regression of this variable on the explanatory
variables female, age and the grade the student eventually obtained for the introductory microeco-
nomics course.24 The results does not show that the propensity to indicate a WTP that exceeds the
expected benefits of sampling once more is related to gender or age. The coefficients do show that
the performance in the microeconomics course and the indicated WTP are negatively related in the
situations with low price uncertainty.
4 Discussion: Risk or loss aversion in price search
Our empirical analysis shows clear support for the inversion of the response of the WTP for continued
search to changes in price uncertainty. This result questions models of consumer search that assume
that buyers act as risk-neutral agents who simply trade off between the expected benefits and costs.
Our theoretical derivations show that both the expected utility specification with risk averse agents
as well as the prospect theory formulation with loss aversion predict the inversion we observe in our
24A number of notes: The students in econometrics are not included in this regression because we lacked identifying
information to match their decisions with background characteristics and grades; Dutch grades are between zero and
ten, with ten being the perfect score. The marginal effects of a probit regression look very similar to the presented linear
regression estimates.
17
Table 5: Regression estimates (Dependent variable: WTP − Exp.Benefit > 0)
p 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low
female -0.029 -0.057 -0.018 0.081
(0.076) (0.054) (0.072) (0.071)
age -0.016 0.006 0.019 0.011
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
grade micro -0.008 -0.029∗ -0.013 -0.052∗∗
(0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
constant 0.653∗ 0.201 -0.077 0.337
(0.356) (0.253) (0.022) (0.336)
R2 0.011 0.03 0.014 0.043
obs. 171 171 171 171
Standard deviations in parentheses. ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statisti-
cal significance at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
data. Moreover, the parameters of both risk and loss aversion that lead to a good fit are close to the
values found in other empirical studies. In all, our findings show that price search is a decision task
where consumer risk attitudes are relevant; they suggest that results from studies on loss aversion in
other domains (such as endowment effects and tax compliance) have external validity for the domain
of price search. This justifies the recent efforts in industrial economics to develop theories that show
how alternative risk-attitudes by buyers impact equilibrium price distributions and can help to explain
phenomena such as sales (e.g. Heidhues and Ko¨szegi, 2014).
Our empirical evidence also adds to the debate on whether or not buyers of goods experience loss
aversion in routine transactions. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) posit that there is no loss aversion
in routine transactions because buyers expect the money outlays associated with the exchange of
goods. However, in the theory developed by Bateman et al. (1997) there is symmetry between the
act of giving up goods and of giving up money with both of them being construed as losses. The
authors of these studies have engaged in an “adversarial collaboration” (Bateman et al., 2005) to
design an experiment to settle the debate. The findings of this experiment by and large support the
hypothesis that money outlays are perceived as losses. However, in another study, Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005) find conflicting evidence that money given up in routine purchases is not subject
to loss aversion. Novemsky and Kahneman point to differences in the subject pools as a potential
cause for the empirical discrepancy and call for additional evidence.25 Our result support the view
that money outlays do evoke loss aversion, also in the context of routine purchasing decisions.
That said, the empirical data that we collected and presented clearly are of an exploratory nature.
25Bateman et al., (2005) uses UK subjects, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) US subjects.
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Although we believe that respondents did not have any reason to misstate their willingness to pay,
they were not incentivized and each respondent only answered four simple questions. It is clear that
a direct test of risk versus loss aversion asks for richer data which allows one to estimate mixture
models to gauge the relative importance of both models (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2009) or to evaluate
the models by fitting the parameters of the alternative models at the individual level (Hey and Orme,
1994). As argued by Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009), there is the possibility that different behavioral
processes co-exist with the risk attitude of some individuals being adequately fitted by expected utility
and those of others by prospect theory. The current study is too limited to pursue this question in
more depth but future research could fruitfully use the relation between the key model parameters and
response to changes in the price variation to identify the relative importance of risk and loss aversion
in price search.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First note that F (p;µ, σ) can be expressed as
















−t2dt the Gauss error function. Note that erf(−x) = −erf(x).
We aim to prove that for p1 ∈ (0, p¯) with p¯ ≡ F−1(1− F (0)), ∂∂σ
∫ p1
0 F (p;µ, σL)dp > 0, ∀ p1 ∈ (0, p¯].
































































which is non-negative for p ≤ µ and negative for p > µ. Therefore, ∂∂σ
∫ p1
0 F (p;µ, σL)dp > 0 clearly















F (p;µ, σL)dp >
∫ p¯
0
F (p;µ, σL)dp = 0.
This completes the proof. Figure A.1 visualizes the argument: Area B is always smaller than area A
for p1 < p¯. .
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Figure A.1: The c.d.f. for p ∼ N(µ, 5) (solid blue line) and p ∼ N(µ, 2) (dotted red line) with µ = 15.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a risk-averse agent with CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw (with w current wealth and
γ ∈ R+) who observes price draws out of a N(µ, σ)-distribution.26 If the agent buys the product at
the best price p1 observed so far, her utility is
u(w; γ) = −1
γ
e−γ(w−p1) (A.6)
Her expected utility in case of continued search, paying a cost s for one more search, is
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To arrive at the final equality, observe that




































In turn, this equals
F (p1)E[e











−(x− µ)2 + 2γxσ2
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We use (A.1) to rewrite (A.8) as
F (p1)E[e












Equating (A.6) and (A.7) and solving for s via a number of manipulations leads to the expression in
equation (4) for the agent’s maximum willingness to pay s∗ to continue search.
Next we wish to derive how the sign of ds
∗
dσ depends on p1, the best price currently observed. In


























































eγp1(1− erf(x)) + eγ(µ+γσ2/2)(1 + erf(x˜))
 . (A.12)
The denominator of (A.12) is non-negative and therefore, ds
∗
dσ = 0 only if the numerator is zero. We
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+ γ2σ(1 + erf(x˜))
Define G(x˜) ≡ 12(1 + erf(x˜)) − 1γσ√2pie−x˜
2
. So, ds∗/dσ = 0 if G(x˜) = 0. Note that G(·) is continuous
in x˜. We prove that there is one unique x˜ for which G(x˜) = 0 by showing that:
i limx˜→−∞G(x˜) = 0, G(x˜) < 0 for x˜ sufficiently small, and limx˜→∞G(x˜) = 1;
ii dG(x˜)/dx˜ = 0 has one unique solution xˇ and that G(xˇ) is decreasing (increasing) for x˜ < (>)xˇ.
Together i) and ii) imply that the value of x˜ for which G(x˜) = 0 must be larger than xˇ and unique.
The proof of i) is immediate using the definition of G(x˜). To prove ii), first take the derivative of





























Solving for x˜ results in
xˇ = − γσ√
2
,
which implies that G(x˜) reaches its minimum when p1 = µ.
We can approximate the value of x˜ such that G(x˜) = 0 by taking a first order Taylor approximation
of the error function and exponent in the expression for G(x˜): erf(x˜) = 2x˜/
√
pi and e−x˜2 = 1 − x˜2.









Solving for x˜ gives












The negative root is irrelevant because it is to the left of xˇ. The corresponding approximate value for
pR1 is





This completes the proof. .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a loss-averse agent with linear consumption utility, loss-aversion parameter λ, and weight η
attached to the linear gain-loss utility with the currently best price p1 acting as a reference point.
27 Let
s be the cost of observing one more price and let these prices p be drawn out of a N(µ, σ) distribution.
Then, the utility when the agent with wealth w stops searching is
u(Stop|p1) = w − p1.
The utility from continued search equals:
u(Continue|p1) = w − p1 − s+ P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1] + η [P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ {P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1] + sP (p > p1 − s)}] .
= −p1 + η˜
[
P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ˜ {P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1] + sP (p > p1 − s)}
]
with η˜ ≡ η+ 1 and λ˜ ≡ (ηλ+ 1)/(η+ 1) such that η˜λ˜ = (ηλ+ 1). In what follows we normalize η = 1
such that η˜ = 2 and λ = (2λ˜− 1). Note that λ˜ = 1 iff. λ = 1.
Define α ≡ (p1 − µ)/σ and β ≡ (p1 − s − µ)/σ (β < α iff. s > 0); we denote the p.d.f. of the





x2 and its c.d.f. Φ(·).
Using these definitions, one can write
E[p|p1 − s < p ≤ p1] = µ+ φ(β)− φ(α)
Φ(α)− Φ(β)σ and
E[p|p ≤ p1 − s] = µ− σ φ(β)
Φ(β)
.
27We assume that the agent’s utility of consuming the good exceeds p1 in all cases such that she buys in all cases and
we for this reason can ignore it in the decision whether or not to continue search.
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So, the agent is indifferent when u(Stop) = u(Continue), i.e. when
p1
{













= s[Φ(β) + λ˜(1− Φ(β))]
which can be simplified to:28
p1
{
Φ(β) + λ˜[Φ(α)− Φ(β)]
}
− µ[λ˜Φ(α) + (1− λ˜)Φ(β)] + λ˜φ(α)σ − (λ˜− 1)φ(β)σ
= λ˜s+ (1− λ˜)sΦ(β).
After combining terms, we have:
f(σ, s) ≡ λ˜(p1 − µ)Φ(α) + (1− λ˜)(p1 − µ− s)Φ(β) + λ˜φ(α)σ − (λ˜− 1)φ(β)σ − λ˜s = 0.
This equation implicitly defines s∗ such that f(σ, s∗) = 0, the search cost that makes the agent
indifferent between stopping and continuing search conditional on the best observed price being p1.
Next we take the partial derivative of f(σ, s) with respect to s and σ and use the implicit function
theorem to determine ds∗/dσ.
∂f(σ, s)
∂σ
= λ˜(p1 − µ)∂Φ(α)
∂σ






































= −λ˜α2φ(α) + λ˜(1 + α2)φ(α)− (1− λ˜)β2φ(β) + (1− λ˜)(1 + β2)φ(β)
= λ˜φ(α) + (1− λ˜)φ(β).















· σ − λ˜
= λ˜(Φ(β)− 1)− Φ(β).
28For λ˜ = 1 the equation reduces to the familiar condition p1 − E[min(p, p1)] = s.
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Consistent with Proposition 1, ∂s∗/∂σ = φ(α) ≥ 0 for λ˜ = 1. The denominator is negative for all
λ˜ > 1 and decreasing in λ˜ because Φ(β) < 1 in the relevant price range when the search cost s > 0.
So, ∂s∗/∂σ = 0 if and only if
λ˜φ(α) + (1− λ˜)φ(β) = 0⇒ λ˜ = φ(β)
φ(β)− φ(α) ≥ 1. (A.15)






















∂s∗/∂σ > 0(< 0) for p1 < (>)pL1 . In this equation, the willingness to pay s∗ > 0 is endogenous. But
because prices are non-negative, s∗ is always finite such that limλ˜↓1 p
L
1 ↑ +∞. .
27
B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Order in which situations were presented
Order
Program (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Total
Economics and Business 36 39 36 35 146
Econometrics 22 20 17 20 79
Pre-MSc 13 12 9 12 46
Minor Finance 2 3 4 3 12
Total 73 74 66 70 283
Note: The orders are (i) = pLsH − pLsL − pHsH − pHsL; (ii) =
pLsL − pLsH − pHsL − pHsH ; (iii) = pHsH − pHsL − pLsH − pLsL;
(iv) = pHsL − pHsH − pLsL − pLsH .
C Survey
General instructions
This is a short survey for research purposes. Please read the instructions carefully. On the next pages,
we will describe four situations. In each situation, we will ask you to write down what you would do
if you were in that particular situation. However, first we give an example of the situations you fill
face.
EXAMPLE: You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just visited offers this product
at a price of e10. There are 100 other firms that offer exactly the same product. You know that one
of these firms charges a price of e1, four charge a price of e3, eleven charge a price of e5 etc. This
information is summarized in Figure C.1 (the current price of e10 is shown by the dotted vertical
line). Unfortunately you don’t know which firm charges what price.
You face the following choice between options a) and b):
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this firm’s price of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the 100 other firms to see whether this
firm offers you the product at a better price.
Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to buy the product at e10 from the
first firm, should the second firm be more expensive. If the second firm charges a price lower than
e10, you can of course buy the product at this lower price.
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Figure C.1: 100 firms. The bars denote the number of firms that charges a given price. The firm you
have just visited offers this product at a price of e10.
In each situation, we ask you to answer the following question:
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see the price of a second firm? [please
fill in a non-negative number with two digits]
e
If you prefer option a), you should fill in ”e0.00”. This means that you are not willing to pay
anything to observe the price of the second retailer. If you prefer option b), you should indicate the
maximum amount you would be willing to pay.
When answering the questions, you may go back and forth between situations but you are not
allowed to discuss with any other person in the room.
Situations
The general instructions were followed by four specific situations. The situations differed only in the
price distribution and the given price p. The four situations are depicted in Figure 3. We only present
the text that accompanied Figure 3a, the price distribution in Situation 1, the texts for Situations 2
to 4 were similar.
Situation 1
You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just visited offers this product at a price of
e10. There are 100 other firms that offer exactly the same product. You know that two of these
firms charge a price of e5, five charge a price of e7, eight charge a price of e9 etc. This information
is summarized in the figure above (the current price of e10 is shown by the dotted vertical line).
29
Figure C.2: Situation 1. 100 firms. The bars denote the number of firms that charges a given price.
The firm you have just visited offers this product at a price of e10.
Unfortunately you don’t know which firm charges what price.
Now you have to decide:
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this firm’s price of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the 100 other firms to see whether this
firm offers you the product at a better price.
Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to buy the product at e10 from the
first firm, should the second firm be more expensive. If the second firm charges a price lower than
e10, you can of course buy the product at this lower price.
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see the price of a second firm? [please
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